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1 Introduction
The effect of trade liberalization on welfare and economic activity remains one of the most
important questions in economics. Prominent theories of international trade show that one of the
main impacts of free trade on welfare is to improve the efficient allocation of resources within
countries. The arguments supporting gains from the so-called reallocation channel are typically
based on long-term equilibira with perfect factor mobility. However, there is significant evidence
in the literature of a slow adjustment of labor markets to trade shocks, which is associated to
frictions in labor mobility due to geographical barriers or sector-specific skills. These labor market
frictions hinder gains from trade and are central in the policy debate.1 The results in the literature
show that the impact of trade depends crucially on the ease of factors of production to move
across firms, sectors and regions, according to the changing patterns of comparative advantage.
The paper contributes to this debate by analyzing a novel friction that may hinder gains from
trade: the reallocation of credit across firms and sectors in the aftermath of a trade shock.
The main implication of our paper is that banks can be indirectly affected by trade liberaliza-
tion, depending on the sectoral composition of their portfolio of loans. Given the role of credit
for both investments in physical capital and working capital, an effect on the supply of credit due
to trade liberalization could potentially restrain the reallocation channel and gains from trade.
To assess this hypothesis we investigate how China’s accession to the WTO affects the supply of
credit by banks to firms and the resulting consequences on the real economy of Italy. As Figure
1 shows, after China entered in the WTO at the end of 2001, there was an acceleration of imports
from China, whereas exports to China were not particularly affected. Following the approach by
Autor et al. (2013), we identify the sectors most affected by import competition from China and
estimate bank exposure to this trade shock by looking at the share of loans to firms in the more af-
fected sectors. Then, we analyze the patterns of credit supply across banks with different degrees
of exposure to the trade shock.
1While employment falls in industries more exposed to import competition, there is no evidence of large movements
of workers towards other, non-exposed, industries. More frequent outcomes for workers in sectors exposed to trade
shocks include instead longer unemployment spells, lower labor force participation and, to some extent, shift towards
non-tradable industries. See among others Topalova (2010), Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), Autor et al. (2013) ,
Kovak (2013) , Dix-Carneiro (2014) , Autor et al. (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2016), Hakobyan and McLaren (2016), Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak (2017) , Utar (2018).
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The key contribution of the paper is to uncover the presence of endogenous financial frictions
arising from trade liberalization and of spillovers between losers and winners from trade that go
through banks. We find that banks more exposed to the trade shock reduce the supply of credit
relative to other banks. Importantly, these banks reduce credit both to firms subject to competi-
tion from China, which we should expect to shrink, and to firms that are not affected by China
and that should actually expand. More specifically, we find that the supply of credit by exposed
banks decreases for firms in manufacturing industries not subject to competition from China (also
once we account for input-output linkages); in exporting sectors where Italy has a comparative
advantage; to the more productive firms within sectors; and to firms in the service sector. This
contraction in credit has real effects on firm outcomes and it leads to significant aggregate losses
in terms of employment, investments, and output.
For our analysis we rely on the credit registry data for Italy and match it to banks and firms
balance sheet. Our dataset covers the universe of loans to firms above e75,000 that were made in
Italy between 1998 and 2007. We then exploit bank and firm identifiers to link the credit data with
detailed information about all banks operating in Italy and the universe of incorporated firms.
This allows us to analyze credit patterns controlling for key bank characteristics and looking into
real outcomes such as firm output, investment and employment.
We begin our analysis by confirming that banks in Italy tend to specialize in industries. As
found in Paravisini et al. (2017), banks are typically heterogeneous in their lending patterns and
tend to be skewed towards specific industries in which they specialize. We find a number of banks
with portfolios heavily concentrated, through their related firms, in industries most affected by the
rise in competition from China. Our source of variation of bank exposure to the trade shock relies
on the share of loans that, before China accession to the WTO, banks have in sectors that turn out
to be more severely affected by competition from China. Then, we compare the evolution of the
allocation of credit across banks with different degrees of exposure.
We firstly use the Khwaja and Mian (2008) within estimator to isolate supply and demand
of credit. We find that more exposed banks decrease credit to firms, such that a bank with a
10p.p. increase in exposure to the trade shock reduce its credit by 3.5%, relative to the other banks
supplying credit to the same firm. Importantly, this reduction affects both firms exposed and non-
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exposed to competition from China. This effect holds not only for manufacturing firms subject to
low competition from China, but also for firms in sectors where Italy has a comparative advantage
to export, for high productivity firms, and for firms in the service sector. This implies that there are
negative financial spillovers to firms not directly affected by Chinese competition and that should
actually expand their absorption of resources.
We investigate if the source of these spillovers comes from local general equilibrium effects, as
firms in sectors not affected by competition from China can suffer a contraction of credit because
located in provinces with a high degree of exposure to China. However, we find that this is not the
case as firms not subject to competition fromChina, located in provinces with lowChina exposure,
still face a reduction in the relative supply of credit from more exposed banks. This suggests that
the transmission mechanism of credit contraction comes from the internal capital market of banks
and not from local general equilibrium factors. Moreover, this result highlights that, while the
labor effects of a trade shock tend to be localized in a specific area, the credit effects of a trade
shock run through bank balance sheets and turn out to be more nationally widespread as banks
operate in multiple regions.
The Khwaja and Mian (2008) within estimator captures changes in the share of credit that a
firm gets from banks with different degrees of treatment. However, it may be the case that a firm
could compensate for the loss in credit from exposed banks with an increase in loans coming from
banks with low exposure. To analyse the total effect on credit, we compute the exposure of firms
to the bank lending channel of the trade shock, as the weighted average of the exposure of all the
banks lending to the firm. Then, we look at the effect of this measure on the total credit that a firm
receives. We find that firms are unable to compensate for the lower share of credit they get from
exposed banks, as firms more exposed to the bank lending channel get less credit in aggregate
relative to other firms and this applies both to firms subject and not subject to competition from
China. These findings suggest that credit relations tend to be sticky and that information frictions
prevent banks and firms to form a new relation in a timely manner.
We then move to look at the implications of exposure to the bank lending channel on real
variables such as employment, investment and output and find a negative effect on firms and a
significant aggregate impact. Following Chodorow-Reich (2014) we run some back of the envelope
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calculation taking as a counterfactual a setting where firm exposure to the bank lending channel
of the trade shock is minimal. We compute what the employment, output, and investment level
would be if all firms were as exposed to the bank lending channel as the firms in the bottom decile
of exposure. We find that, over the period 2002-2007, employment would have been about 2.2
percentage points higher. Sectors subject to competition from China account for about two-thirds
of the employment decline (1.5 p.p.) and those not exposed to China for the remaining third (0.7
p.p.). While it is difficult to determine whether the employment decline of firms subject to the
competition of China is optimal, as we could expect a decline regardless of bank exposure, the
employment contraction of firms not exposed to China highlights how the bank lending channel
of a trade shock can hinder resource reallocation. Similar effects are found for investments and
revenues.
In order to investigate the mechanisms that could drive our results, we exploit detailed infor-
mation on banks’ balance sheets. Firstly, we observe that in sectors subject to higher competition
from China, the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) increases by 40% in the period after China’s
entry to the WTO. This is not the case for the sectors subject to lower competition from China.
Then, we test the relation between various bank’s balance sheet characteristics and bank exposure.
We find that bank exposure is associated to higher NPLs ration by banks after China’s entrance
in the WTO and to a reduction in the core capital of banks, whereas we do not find an effect on
deposit or interbank funding. This suggests that the main channel goes through a reduction in the
core capital of banks, due to the NPLs, and that these banks become more fund constrained. As
a validation point of this mechanism, we find that banks with a higher tier 1 capital ratio before
China’s entrance in the WTO reduce credit significantly less relative to other banks, and for very
high levels of tier 1 ratio the effect of bank exposure on the supply of credit becomes insignificant.
The results of the paper are likely to extend to other countries where banks have some degree
of loan concentration in certain industries and banks are the main source of funding for firms.
Importantly, our findings are consistent with the prediction of classical banking models such as
Froot et al. (1993), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Froot and Stein (1998) and Deyoung et al. (2015),
which reinforces the generality of our results. In thesemodels banks face twomain frictions: costly
external funding and illiquid loans (i.e. banks cannot fully sell the loans they made). In theory,
when there is a shock, it is optimal for banks to shift away from assets positively correlated with
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their net worth. Hence, if some firms are hit by a trade shock from China, and their process of
adjustment is uncertain, banks with a higher share of loans to these firms should adjust their
portfolio and move away from firms subject to competition from China (more strongly than non-
exposed banks) and at the same time increase loans to the other firms. However, if banks suffer
from losses that cannot be immediately restored due to costs in raising capital, they might be
unable to increase credit to less exposed firms, which is in fact what we find in the paper.2
The paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the paper is linked to the core
question of how the economy adjusts to trade shocks. This literature has largely focused on the
(slow) reallocation of workers across sectors as in Autor et al. (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2016), Dix-
Carneiro (2014), Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), Utar (2018); or across regions in Autor et al.
(2013), Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017), Hakobyan and McLaren (2016), Kovak (2013), Topalova
(2010), Aghion et al. (2008). There is only very limited evidence on capital reallocation after trade
shocks, even though, as argued by Dix-Carneiro (2014) , quantifying the mobility of capital, and
its interaction with labor mobility frictions, is essential to understanding the full transitional dy-
namics of the economy after a trade shock. A notable exception is Antra`s and Caballero (2009)
who focus on the effects of a trade shock on international capital flows across countries, and also
Lanteri et al. (2019) who look at the reallocation of machines and physical capital in Peru after the
China shock.
The paper speaks also to the literature on credit and trade, such as Manova (2008), Amiti and
Weinstein (2011), Minetti and Zhu (2011), Manova (2012), Chor and Manova (2012), Paravisini
et al. (2015), and Antra`s and Foley (2015). These papers typically look at the effects of credit
constraints and shocks to funding on firms’ exports. Here, we look at the effects of credit shocks,
which arise endogenously from trade liberalization, on the reallocation channel.
Our paper is also related to the burgeoning literature on the financial and real implications of
shocks to banks (Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Paravisini, 2008; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Schnabl,
2012; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Paravisini et al., 2015; Jime´nez et al., 2014; Baskaya and Kalemli-
Ozcan, 2016; Cingano et al., 2016; Huber, 2018; Amiti and Weinstein, 2018). With respect to this
2Over time banks should be able to restore their core funding, so the credit effect of a trade shock should fade away
over the medium run. Unfortunately, we are unable to analyze the medium-long run effects because of the global
financial crisis hitting the banking system in 2008.
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line of research, the shock to banks in our study comes from the real sector rather than from
the financial sector per se, as in the case of the global financial crisis, or from natural disasters.
Moreover, contrary to other type of shocks, trade shocks have winners and losers and ideally this
should provide guidance to banks for allocating credit across firms, but we find that this is not
the case. This is all the more important as trade is a pervasive and important policy issue. There-
fore, understanding how trade liberalization affects banks, credit allocation, and firm activities
provides a novel contribution.
Finally, the paper is related to recent studies that look at how banks transmit liquidity shocks
across markets (Gilje et al., 2016; Romero Corte´s and Strahan, 2017; Bustos et al., 2017). As larger
banks operate in several markets, positive or negative shocks that hit a specific region change
the availability of funding or the demand for credit from customers operating in the region; as a
consequence, the bankmight change its lending decisions vis-a`-vis customers in other regions, and
thus transmit shocks across regions. With respect to this literature, we investigate banks’ capital
reallocation after being exposed to a specific trade shock, and hence add evidence on the banking
sector’s broader contribution to the structural adjustment of an economy after trade liberalization.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 explains
the empirical strategy; Section 4 reports the baseline results on the intensive and extensivemargins
of credit; Section 5 discusses the robustness of our results; Section 6 estimates the effects on total
credit and the aggregate real effects on output, investment and employment; Section 7 focuses on
the mechanism behind our results; Section 8 concludes.
2 Data and Measurement
2.1 Data sources
Our analysis is based on a matched bank-firm dataset containing loans for a large sample of Ital-
ian companies. The final dataset is obtained by combining four sources: credit register; banks’
balance sheets data; firms’ balance sheets data; data on imports of goods, by product, source and
destination country.
The first source is the Italian Credit Register administered by the Bank of Italy, which contains a
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monthly panel of the outstanding debt of every borrower (firms or individuals) with loans above
EUR 75,000 with each bank operating in Italy. We focus on corporate borrowers and build an
annual bank-firm panel, where loans are measured as the outstanding credit granted at the end of
a given year. The baseline estimates are run on the subset of firms in the manufacturing sector. We
also report results including firms in non-manufacturing sectors. As banks use the credit register
in order to assess the creditworthiness of their current or prospective borrowers, its data quality
is very high.
Banks’ balance sheet data are from the Bank of Italy Supervisory reports, which provide de-
tailed data on banks’ assets and liabilities. Firms’ balance sheet data (including variables such as
revenues, investment, employment, wage bill) are taken from the CERVED database, which cov-
ers the universe of incorporated firms in Italy. We match the bank-firm loan data to banks’ and
firms’ balance sheet data using unique bank and firm identifiers, respectively.
Finally, we use data from the UN Comtrade Database on Italy’s (as well as other advanced
economies’) imports from China at the six-digit Harmonized System (HS) product level. We con-
vert the product classification to the more aggregate NACE 4-digit using concordance tables pro-
vided by Eurostat. This information is needed to identify the exposure of firms and banks (via
their loan portfolio) to the China shock (see subsection 2.2).
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of banks and firms characteristics in our sample. The unit
of observation in our empirical analysis is at the bank-firm annual level. The dataset includes,
on average, 504 banks and about 86 thousand manufacturing firms. Multiple banking is very
common in Italy, also among small firms (Detragiache et al., 2000). About 75% of firms in our
sample borrow from two or more banks and the average number of banking relations per firm is
3.4. As we discuss in the following sections the fact that firms borrow from multiple banks is an
essential feature of our identification strategy.
2.2 Defining firm and bank exposure to the China shock
To implement our empirical approach, we firstly need to identify those borrowers that were
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more likely to be hit by the growth in imports from China and then we need to measure banks’
overall exposure to these borrowers. For the first step, we follow closely Autor et al. (2013) in
their empirical strategy and compute the following sector-level (4-digit) measure of exposure to
the China shock3:
ChinaITs =
∆M IT−CHs
LITs,1991
(1)
The numerator is the difference in Italy’s imports from China in a given 4-digit NACE sector s
between the years after China’s accession toWTO (2002-2007 average) and those before (1994-2001
average).4 The denominator corresponds to the employment level in the same sector in 1991.5 Ac-
cording to this measure, the five sectors with the highest exposure to the China shock are ‘Coke
and oven products’, ‘Watches and clocks’, ‘Television and radio receivers’, ‘Games and toys’,
‘Other organic basic chemicals’. The least exposed sectors are instead ‘Aircraft and spacecraft’,
‘Carpets and rugs’, ‘Beer’, ‘Sugar’, ‘Distilled alcoholic beverages’. Using this sector-level measure
of exposure, we define firm i as subject to the China shock or more simply ‘treated’ (DITis = 1) if
its main sector of activity falls in the upper half of the distribution (i.e. its exposure is above the
median values across 4-digit sectors):6
DITis =


1, if ChinaITs >Median
0, otherwise
(2)
For each bank b, we then measure its exposure to the China shock as the share of its loans to
treated firms on its total loans to manufacturing companies. As robustness we also use the share
of loans to treated firms relative to total bank’s assets and results are confirmed.7 To attenuate
endogeneity issues and possible portfolio adjustments by banks in anticipation of China’s entrance
into the WTO, we measure banks’ exposure averaging the shares over the years 1998-2000.8
3We exclude the oil and energy sectors, which are more volatile and subject to global fluctuations, if we include
those sectors all results hold
4The results are robust to using the difference in imports between 1994 and 2007.
5We take the year 1991 because it is the one with census data, before that the raise of China could affect the employ-
ment structure by sector. The alternative census year would be 2001, but it is likely to be less exogenous to the raise of
China.
6As a robustness we also use a continuous measure of firm treatment to compute bank exposure and results are
confirmed (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
7Table A3 in the Appendix report the results of our baseline specification using the share of loans to treated firms
relative to total bank’s assets rather than to loans to manufacturing firms.
8We prefer to average our measure of bank exposure over multiple years rather than taking a single year (e.g. 1998),
so we avoid some bias that may arise from a year specific shock at the beginning of the period. We start from 1998
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ExposureITb =
∑
i
CibD
IT
is∑
i
Cib
(3)
As Table 1 shows, the median bank exposure amounts to 0.358, with a standard deviation of
0.218 (see Figure 2 for the density distribution). In Table 2 we follow the approach of Imbens
and Wooldridge (2008) and show the balance of ”exposed” (above median exposure) and ”non-
exposed” (below median exposure) banks by looking at the normalized difference of bank and
borrower characteristics over the period 1998-2000. As a rule of thumb, Imbens and Wooldridge
(2008) argue that a normalized difference of covariates above 0.25 standard deviations is substan-
tial. In our case, all variables are within this tolerance threshold, although banks’ total assets and
the share of core liabilities are close to it. Reassuringly, the characteristics of the borrower across
the two groups show a high degree of overlap.
A standard concern is that Italy’s imports from China might capture not only a pure ‘China
supply’ effect but also shocks to Italian demand for imports, which could be correlated with lend-
ing decisions. In addition, there might be measurement issues, as this measure does not account
for Italian exports to third countries being affected by the raise of China (e.g. Italian exports to
Germany that are now substitute by Chinese exports to Germany). Following Autor et al. (2013),
we instrument the trade shock using the variation in imports from China of a set of advanced
economies other than Italy (∆MOCs ).
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This instrumental approach aims to recover supply-side determinants of imports from China,
rather than Italian local factors. The motivation for this instrument is that high income economies
are similarly exposed to growth in imports from China that is driven from Chinese supply shocks.
However, the instrument relies on two key underlying assumptions: i) industry demand shocks
should be uncorrelated across countries and ii) demand shocks from Italy do not trigger increas-
ing returns to scale in Chinese manufacturing and do not induce them to export more to other
high income countries. It is possible that industry demand shocks across European countries are
correlated, so as a robustness we also use US imports only as an instrument and results hold.10
because it is the first year with data on banks’ balance sheet in our sample; and we end in 2000 as it is a year before
China access into the WTO, so it is more exogenous than ending in 2001.
9The countries other than Italy chosen as benchmark are USA, Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand, Switzerland, and Spain. The results are robust to variations in the set of other countries considered.
10Table A2 in the Appendix report the results of our baseline specification using only the US imports from China as
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Moreover, the instrument should capture the effect of Chinese competition that affects Italian firms
not only domestically, but also in international markets. Specifically, we compute an industry-
level measure of exposure to China shock based on Chinese imports of a group of other countries
(ChinaOCs ) and use it to identify the corresponding set of ‘treated’ firms (D
OC
is ).
ChinaOCs =
∆MOC−CHs
LITs,1991
(4)
DOCis =


1, if ChinaOCs >Median
0, otherwise
(5)
Armed with this different definition of treated firms, we compute a measure of bank exposure
which is exogenous to demand developments in Italy (ExposureOCb ) and can therefore be used as
an instrument in our estimation strategy. Moreover, this measure is also exogenous to the supply
of credit of Italian banks, in fact, while on principle bank credit in Italy can affect Italian imports
from China, it can hardly affect the imports of the US or Germany from China:
ExposureOCb =
∑
i
CibD
OC
is∑
i
Cib
(6)
Our measure of bank exposure focuses on imports and does not take into account exports.
On principle, China’s entrance in the WTO could create export opportunities for Italian firms and
this could potentially have some positive effects for the banks related to these firms, for instance
through an increase in deposits or a rise in loans for firms’ expansion into China. However, as
Figure 1 shows, the share of Italian exports to China after China access into the WTO was not
different from the one in the early 1990s, so empirically the export channel is unlikely to be partic-
ularly relevant. Moreover, as Borin and Mancini (2016) show, Italian exports to China account for
70% of the Italian content of China’s imports; this means that e.g. German exports to China that
use Italian intermediates are unlikely to provide a strong boost on the export channel. Finally, for
banks the downside of trade liberalization tend to be bigger than the upsides. While firms subject
to import competition can affect banks because they don’t repay their debt; the profits associated
to more exports are more likely to be retained by firms and not necessarily passed to banks. For
an instrument.
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these reasons, we focus our main analysis on the effects of import competition, but we control for
the export channel in the robustness section.
3 Empirical Strategy
For our identification strategy, we exploit the ex-ante heterogeneity across banks in terms of their
exposure to the China shock, as defined in Equation (3). The goal of our empirical strategy is to
identify the impact of bank exposure on the supply of credit to firms and the implication that this
has on resource reallocation. Figure 3 compares the trends in aggregate lending to Italianmanufac-
turing companies between banks that were ex-ante above median of exposure to the China shock
(blue continuous line) and below median (red dashed line). The two time series for aggregate
credit are indexed to 100 at the end of 2001. While lending growth was initially very similar across
the two groups of banks, since 2002 the two trends start diverging: lending by banks that were
more exposed to the China shock grew significantly less compared to lending by non-exposed
banks. However, this diverging pattern can be the result of both supply and demand effects, as
firms subject to competition from China may shrink and demand less credit, driving the aggregate
pattern of more exposed banks.
Therefore, Figure 4 further disaggregates lending by the two groups of banks according to
borrowers characteristics. In particular, we distinguish between borrowers operating in sectors
with a China shock exposure above median (‘treated’ firms) and those in sectors below median
(‘control’ firms). In this way we can compare the lending patterns across banks to firms with a
similar evolution of credit demand. The figure shows that lending by exposed banks grew more
slowly than that by non-exposed banks both for treated and control firms. While these aggregate
patterns provide suggestive evidence of differences in credit allocation between exposed and non-
exposed banks, the results might be driven by compositional effects, demand shocks, and other
multiple factors. We rely on our empirical strategy to properly identify such effects.
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3.1 Baseline specification: the intensive margin of credit
Our empirical approach firstly relies on the Khwaja and Mian (2008) estimation that allows to
isolate demand and supply effects exploiting the fact that firms borrow from multiple banks. For
each bank-firm-year observation our baseline specification is:
lnCibt = β1 Exposure
IT
−i,b × Postt + β2 Specibt +X
′
bδ × Postt + αit + γib + ǫibt (7)
The dependent variable is the log of outstanding credit granted by bank b to firm i at the
end of year t. The variable ExposureIT
−i,b measures the ex-ante exposure of banks to borrowers
that are hit by the China shock (measured using Italian imports from China) and it is interacted
with the dummy Postt equal to one for the years after China’s accession to WTO (2002-2007),
and zero for the earlier years (1998-2001).11 This variable is instrumented using a measure of
bank exposure computed taking other advanced countries’ imports from China (ExposureOC
−i,b), as
defined in Equation 6. Xb is a vector of control variables with the 1998-2000 average of key bank
attributes (interacted with a post-period dummy) such as the log-assets as a proxy of bank size;
share of NPLs, which captures bank performance and management; bank core liabilities, which
control for the funding structure of the bank; and the capital ratio, which controls for the degree
of bank leverage. We include a set of firm-bank fixed effects (γib), which control for potential non-
random matching between firms and banks and all time-invariant factors that may affect the loan
level for any bank-firm pair such as relational banking. Finally, we add firm-year fixed-effects
(αit), which capture any shock that hits a firm in year t, which affects credit demand (including
productivity shocks or demand for goods shocks). However, in expectations demand shocks may
not be equally distributed across banks and demand shocks may not change symmetrically across
banks; hence, we follow Paravisini et al. (2017) and we add a specialization dummy that take the
value of 1 if a bank is specialized in lending to the sector the firm operates.12 Given that our source
of variation is at the bank level and the original China shock is defined at the sectoral level, we
double cluster the standard errors at the bank and sector level.13 In the baseline specification, the
11The measure of banks’ exposure that we use in the regression is computed from equation 3 leaving out firm i
to avoid endogeneity with the dependent variable. In our sample credit to firm i is typically too small to affect the
aggregate bank exposure: on average firms account for 0.0001% of bank credit. As a robustness we leave out also the
entire sector that a firm belongs to and results hold, see Table A4 in the Appendix.
12Following Paravisini et al. (2017) a bank is considered to be specialized in one sector if its share of loans in that
sector is above the sum of 75th percentile threshold and 1.5 the interquartile range across banks for a given sector-year.
13A recent literature has investigated various issues arising in the context of shift-share regression designs (Adao,
Kolesar and Morales (2018); Borusyak et al. (2018); Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018)). Focusing on inference issues,
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observations are unweighted. However, as a robustness we estimate Equation 7 also weighting
observations by log-employment and results are confirmed.14
Given the presence of firm-time fixed effects, β1 is identified exploiting the variation across
multiple lenders within firm. Multiple banking is very common in Italy, also among small firms
(Detragiache et al., 2000). About 75% of firms in our sample borrow from two or more banks and
the average number of banking relations per firm is 3.4. The coefficient β1 identifies the marginal
effect of bank exposure on the share of credit supplied to a given firm after China’s entrance in
the WTO. This specification captures the intensive margin of credit and in Section 6 we extend our
analysis on the aggregate credit that a firm receives, so we can control if lower credit from exposed
banks is compensated by higher credit from other banks.
Equation 7 captures the effect of bank exposure on credit for the average firm in the sam-
ple. However, we are interested in disentangling this effect for firms subject to competition from
China, which should shrink, and for firms that are not subject to Chinese competition and that
should remain unaffected or expand. In order to have a complete picture of the underlying ef-
fects, firstly, we look at firms that are in sectors above or belowmedian of exposure to competition
from China, as defined in Equation 2. We call the former ”treated” firms and the latter ”control”
firms. Our implicit assumption is that control firms are those towards which resources should be
reallocated and hence they should not face a reduction of credit. However, we extend this ap-
proach by looking at several groups of firms. We distinguish between firms in sectors where Italy
has a comparative disadvantage or a comparative advantage to export. In doing so we discern
between the comparative advantage sectors subject to competition from China (treated) and those
Adao, Kolesar and Morales (2018) caution against potential correlation in the residuals that arises if residuals contain
unobserved shocks that vary at the same level as the variable of interest, and derive novel confidence intervals that
allow for a shift-share structure in the residuals. Borusyak et al. (2018) prove that shift-share IV coefficients are iden-
tically obtained from a weighted IV regression at the level of the shock underlying the shift-share instrument (i.e. the
industry level in our case) and show how to use this equivalence result in order to obtain standard errors that are valid
in the Adao, Kolesar and Morales (2018) framework. Clustering standard errors at the bank and sector level (as we
do in our baseline specification) already goes in the direction of taking into account the issue of correlated residuals
for banks that have a similar sectoral composition of their loan portfolio. As a robustness, in the Appendix we also
report shift-share IV coefficients, where standard errors are obtained from equivalent industry-level regressions (as in
Borusyak et al. (2018)).
14As a robustness, we compute Equation (7) also in first difference taking the average of the pre- and post- period for
the variables of interest, as in the original paper of Khwaja and Mian (2008). The advantage of our approach is to make
full use of the panel dimension of the data, whereas the advantage of the time collapsing of data is to make standard
errors robust to concerns of auto-correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004). In the appendix we show that our baseline estimates
in first difference obtained running∆ lnCibt = β1 Exposure
IT
−i,b + β2 Specib +X
′
bδ + αi + ǫib confirm the results (see
Table A5).
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that are not (control). According to classic models of trade (e.g. Ricardo-Viner) control firms in
comparative advantage sectors are the ones that should benefit from China access to theWTO and
the resulting overall expansion of global trade. Another important distinction that we look at is
between firms with productivity below or higher than their sectoral average. According to models
of trade with firms heterogeneity, such as Melitz (2003), we should expect more productive firms
to expand and absorb more resources, especially those in sectors not subject to competition from
China. Finally, we look at firms in manufacturing and service sector, as the latter should be more
isolated from a direct effect of the trade shock and could potentially absorb more resources.15 In
order to analyze the effect of bank exposure across these different groups of firms we run the
following specification:
lnCibt =
∑
d
β1d Ddi × Exposure
IT
−i,b × Postt + β2 Specibt +X
′
bδ × Postt + αit + γib + ǫibt (8)
the coefficient β1d captures the marginal effect of bank exposure to the trade shock on firms in
group Ddi, where the groups are the ones discussed above (e.g. treated and control; compara-
tive advantage and comparative disadvantage, etc.) and Ddi is a dummy equal to one for firms
belonging to that group and zero otherwise.
3.2 Identification challenges
Our first concern for identification relates to endogeneity due to reverse causality, as bank
credit can itself influence Italian imports from China and affect our measure of exposure. To
address this issue we use the imports from China of other advanced countries, which are hardly
affected by the credit of banks to Italian firms. Moreover, in the regression, which runs at the firm-
bank-year level, we leave out the firm credit to compute banks’ exposure and as a robustness we
leave out also the credit to the entire sector of the firm.
Another important endogeneity concern is about the randomness of the China shock on banks,
15In Section 4 we describe more in details the definitions of comparative advantage and productivity that we use for
the analysis.
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as bank exposure to firms subject to competition from China may be related to some key observ-
able or unobservable characteristics that affect credit supply. For instance if the sectors subject
to Chinese competition are more traditional and less innovative, banks that have a high share
of loans to firms in such sectors may be more risk averse and we would capture the effect of
differences in risk aversion rather than the impact of the trade shock. In Table 2 we show the bal-
ance between ”exposed” (above median exposure) and ”non-exposed” (below median exposure)
banks. We follow the approach of Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) and by looking at the normal-
ized difference of banks and borrowers characteristics over the period 1998-2000 (pre-shock). As
Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) argue a normalized difference of covariates above 0.25 standard
deviations is substantial. In our case, all variables are within this tolerance threshold, although
banks’ total assets and the share of core liabilities are close to the threshold. These include also ob-
servables that are correlated to unobservable characteristics, such as the credit score of borrowers,
as a proxy of banks’ risk aversion, and banks’ profits and share of non-performing loans, which is
likely to correlate with managers’ quality. Moreover, we saturate the regressions with a series of
controls of bank characteristics that should mitigate concerns about omitted variables. Finally, as
an additional validation of our empirical strategy, we exploit the panel structure of the data and
estimate a dynamic diff-in-diff. This allows to control for different pre-trends across banks, which
may be related to banks’ characteristics, and to analyze the timing of the effect on China exposure:
lnCibt =
2007∑
q=1998
βq Exposure
IT
−i,b × ✶t=q + β2 Specibt +
2007∑
q=1998
X
′
bδq × ✶t=q + αit + γib + ǫibt (9)
This specification yields a series of estimates of βq that shows the full dynamics for credit alloca-
tion, and how they differ for the years before and after China access into the WTO. Also in this
case we instrument the main variable of interest with ExposureOC
−i,b.
Our identification strategy is challenged also by potential anticipation effects. Our results
would be biased if some banks, e.g. the better ones, anticipated the effects of the WTO agreement
with China and reduced their exposure to firms that will turn to be subject to Chinese competition.
However, as Bloom et al. (2016) show, there was a considerable uncertainty about the conclusion
and the details of the trade agreement with China, which makes it hard for banks to predict the ef-
fects on the firms they are lending to. Moreover, credit relations tend to be sticky and it is unusual
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for local branches to cut credit to firms they have been lending to for some time in anticipation of
an event with uncertain consequences. Finally, we compute bank exposure by taking the portfolio
composition of banks in the period 1998-2000, so between three to one year before the conclusion
of the agreement, which could be hardly anticipated at that time.
In relation to identification threats from confounding factors, the presence of firm-time fixed
control for causes associated to firms (e.g trends in external financial needs between treated and
control firms; historically declining or raising sectors). However, shocks that hit banks at the same
time as China access to the WTO, and that affect exposed and non-exposed banks differently,
would pose potential threats to identification. We are particularly worried about i) the rise of
Italian banks’ cross-border funding, which occurred in the context of growing financial integration
in the euro area since 2002; ii) the strong GDP slowdown that hit the Italian economy in 2002-03;
iii) and the rise of securitization in the early 2000s. These factors, which are independent from
China access into the WTO, may affect bank lending and drive our results. We discuss more in
details and test for these factors in Section 5 and we show that our results are robust to these
concerns.
A final issue is that Equations 7 and 8 capture the intensive margin, as they account only for
bank-firm credit relations that exist before and after China’s entrance in the WTO. However, we
are also interested in the effects on the extensive margin of credit. For this reason we run the
following specification:
Entry
post
ib (Exit
post
ib ) = β1 Exposure
IT
−i,b + β2 Specibt +X
′
bδ + αi + ǫib (10)
where the dependent variable takes the value of one if bank b and firm i starts (exit) a lending
relation after 2001. The coefficient of interest β1 captures the marginal effect of a bank’s exposure
to the trade shock on the probability that bank b starts (ends) a credit relation with firm i. The
specification account for whether the bank is specialized in the sector the firm operates, for bank’s
pre-characteristics, and for firm fixed effects; errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digits) level.
We run this specification also disentangling the effects on treated and control firms. In Section 6
we look at the effect of bank exposure on the total credit of firms accounting for both the intensive
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and extensive margin.
4 Baseline results
4.1 Intensive margin of credit
Table 3 reports the results of OLS (Column 1) and 2SLS (Column 2) estimates of our baseline
equation 7. Firm-time fixed effects, firm-bank fixed effects, bank specialization dummy and bank
controls (interacted with the Postt dummy) are always included. The coefficient of interest on
bank exposure is negative and statistically significant in both specifications. This suggests that
banks that are exposed to the China shock reduce their lending to manufacturing firms compared
to non-exposed banks after China’s accession to WTO. The effect is quantitatively significant. The
coefficient on the full 2SLS model amounts to -0.11: for a given firm, banks with a shock exposure
that is one standard deviation higher than other banks supply 11% less credit between the pre-
and post-2001 years.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 looks at the effect of bank exposure on treated and control firms,
where treatment is defined as being in sectors that face an increase of competition from China
above median. The results show that the supply of credit from more exposed banks decreases
for both types of firms. The point-estimate of the coefficient is slightly lower for control firms
(-0.10 versus -0.11 in the 2SLS specification), but the two coefficients are not statistically different.
This finding points to financial spillovers to firms that, although not directly exposed to Chinese
competition, end up facing a contraction in lending from banks hit by the trade shock. Given the
relevance that credit has for investments and working capital, this is likely to hinder the process
of resource reallocation in the aftermath of a trade shock. In Section 6 we analyze more directly
the effects of bank exposure on employment and investments for treated and control firms.
The comparison between the coefficient on OLS and that on 2SLS suggests that the degree
of endogeneity of Italian imports from China to Italian demand, or at least its effect on credit, is
low and the rise in Chinese imports is mostly driven by an exogenous supply shock from China.
Moreover, although an exact comparison cannot be made due to different shocks and specifica-
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tions, the magnitude of our finding is lower than the one estimated for the global financial crisis
by Chodorow-Reich (2014) in the US and by Cingano et al. (2016) for Italy.
Figure 5 reports the results for the dynamic diff-in-diff expressed in Equation 9 for the instru-
mented year-by-year coefficients. The marginal effect of bank exposure on credit supply shows
no clear pattern before 2001. The point estimate for 1998 is positive but not statistically different
from zero, whereas it is practically zero for the three years before China access to the WTO. In
2002 we start to observe a decline in the supply of credit by exposed banks, but it is not yet statis-
tically different from zero; the coefficient becomes significant after 2003. The point estimates for
the years 2003-2007 are not statistically different from each other. Unfortunately, we cannot test
for the long-term effects of exposure on credit as the global financial crisis hit banks in 2008 and
that would bias our estimates for the years after that.
In the baseline specification, the control group is defined as firms in manufacturing sectors
with exposure to competition from China below median. Our implicit assumption is that those
are the firms towards which resources should be reallocated and hence they should not face a
reduction of credit. We now extend this definition in several ways.
First, we distinguish between firms in sectors where Italy has a comparative advantage or
a comparative disadvantage in exporting.16 Among the sectors with comparative advantage, we
identify those subject to competition fromChina above and belowmedian (treatment and control).
Table 4 shows that exposed banks reduce credit also to firms in the strongest exporting sectors, the
ones with comparative advantage and not subject to Chinese competition. These are firms where
we may have expected an increase in the supply of credit.
The reallocation channel of a trade shock might work not only across sectors but also within
sectors, with the more productive firms absorbing the resources of the less productive ones that
exit the market in a given sector (Melitz, 2003). Therefore, we look at the effects on credit dividing
16Using COMTRADE data, we compute a standard Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage for each 3-digit
sector. It corresponds to the ratio between the share of Italian exports in a given sector on world exports in the same
sector and the share of Italian aggregate exports on world aggregate exports. We then apply the usual transformation
so that the index is bounded between -1 and 1. Italy has a comparative advantage in a sector when the index is above
zero, and a comparative disadvantage when the index is below zero. The index refers to the 1994-1998 average. World
exports correspond to the sum of exports from 89 countries (i.e. countries for which Comtrade data are available in
each year of the reference period).
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our sample between firms that have a productivity above and below the average of their sector be-
fore China’s entrance in the WTO.17 The results in Table 4 shows that also high productivity firms
suffer from a credit reduction and this is the case also if firms are not subject to competition from
China. This suggests that also the within-sector reallocation can be hindered by banks’ exposure
to the trade shock.
We then look beyond manufacturing, extending our sample to firms in the service industry.18
Firms in services are more isolated from a direct effect of the trade shock and they provide a
relevant control group, as they could potentially absorb more resources. Column 2 in Table 6
shows the baseline results for firms in the service sector is negative and significant.
These results show that the credit effects of a trade shock generate negative spillovers to firms
that could absorb resources in the reallocation process after a trade shock. This holds across several
groups of firms that on principle should be gaining from trade liberalization and be the engine of
the reallocation channel.
4.2 Extensive margin
We then explore the extensive margin of credit supply. We compute an ‘entry’ dummy equal to
one if a firm has no credit from a bank before 2002 and had credit from the same bank after 2002:
this signals the start of a new credit relationship for a given firm-bank pair. Similarly, we compute
an ‘exit’ dummy equal to one if a firm had credit from a bank before 2002 and has no credit from
the same bank after 2002 (i.e. the credit relationship has been severed).
Table 7 reports the results of a linear probability model on equation 10. Starting with columns
1-3, we find that banks that are more exposed to the China shock are less likely to start new credit
relationships with firms after China’s entry into the WTO. This holds not only for treated firms
but also for control firms, although the magnitude of the effect is larger (in absolute terms) for
17We compute total factor productivity at the firm level (TFPR) following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and
Wooldridge (2009). We take the firm average and the sector weighted average TFPR for the period 1998-2000 and
we define high vs. low productive firms according to whether they are above or below their sectoral average.
18Services includewholesale and retails trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food service activities,
information and communication, and professional, scientific and technical services.
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the former than for the latter. Exposed banks are also less likely to terminate credit relationships
(columns 4-6), but the coefficient on the probability of exit is smaller than that on the probability
of entry. This suggests that higher bank exposure is associated with a decrease in the net entry
of credit relationships. For the full sample, a one standard deviation increase in bank exposure is
associated with a decline in the probability of entry of 6 percentage points.
5 Robustness
We run an extensive set of robustness checks with alternative measures of firms and banks
exposure and with different econometric specifications. Tables A1-A6 in the Appendix report
the results, showing that all our main results are unchanged when: i) bank exposure is captured
using a continuous measure of the change in imports from China rather than the median cutoff;
ii) exposure to competition from China is instrumented using the change in imports of the US
only rather than of a larger set of advanced economies; iii) bank exposure is measured as the ratio
of loans to treated firms on banks’ total assets rather than on banks’ corporate loans; iv) bank
exposure is measured leaving out credit to the sector where the firm operates; v) a first difference
transformation of the baseline Equations 7 and 8 are estimated; vi) observations are weighted by
firm size.
In this section we focus instead on three further aspects of our robustness analysis: i) the
role of input-output linkages; ii) the geographical dimension of the bank lending channel and iii)
confounding factors that could possibly undermine our identification strategy.
5.1 Taking into account input-output linkages
Our baseline definition of firm exposure to the China shock as expressed in Equation 1 and 4
considers only the direct exposure of a given industry, and therefore ignores indirect exposures via
input-output linkages. We follow (Acemoglu et al., 2016) and adjust our measure of exposure to
account for upstream input-output linkages, in order to capture trade shocks to the purchasers of
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a given industry’s output.19 We then compute a new overall indicator of exposure at the sectoral
level that is the sum of the direct and upstream measures and recompute the measure of bank
exposure on the basis of this new measure.20 Table 8 confirms the baseline results and we find a
negative effect on credit to control firms also once we account for input-output linkages.
5.2 The geographical dimension of the bank lending channel
We now analyse the geographical dimension of the credit effects of a trade shock. The labor
effects of a trade shock tend to be concentrated in specific areas (Autor et al., 2013). They can
spillover to other sectors through input-output linkages (Acemoglu et al., 2016), but there is not
much evidence of spillovers across geographic areas also when we account for these indirect link-
ages (Adao, Arkolakis and Esposito, 2018). However, in the case of the credit effect, banks’ balance
sheet could be a vehicle of transmission of geographical spillovers, as banks operate across differ-
ent regions. In order to investigate this possibility, we look at our results across provinces with
different degree of exposure. We compute province exposure as the employment weighted av-
erage of its sectors’ exposure to the China shock as defined in Equation 4. If the credit effects of
the trade shock were local, we should see no effects in provinces with low degree of exposure to
China.
Table 9 reports the baseline results from Equation 7 and 8 dividing our sample between firms
located in provinces above and belowmedian of exposure to the China shock. We see that there are
negative and significant credit effects for firms located both in high and in low exposed provinces.
The magnitude of the point estimate of the effect for treated firms in high exposed provinces
(-0.122) is larger than the one for control firms in low-exposed provinces (-0.097), but the two
coefficients are not statistically different. These results suggest that the credit effects of the trade
shock are not localized, but they tend to be geographically distributed also to areas with low
19For each industry j, we calculate an upstream effect, which is equal to the weighted average change in Chinese
imports across all industries that purchase from industry j, where the weight is the share of industry j’s total sales
that are used as inputs by industry g. To measure these inter-industry linkages, we use the 1995 input-output table,
which predates China’s entry into the WTO. One limitation is that for Italy this is available at the 2-digit industry only.
Therefore, we assume that for a given 4-digit industry its input and output shares are proportional to the corresponding
shares of its 2-digit industry.
20The correlation between the baseline measure of bank exposure and the new one is 0.83. At the industry level,
about 10 per cent of sectors shift classification.
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direct exposure to the trade shock, because of the lending channel effect through exposed banks
operating in different provinces.
5.3 Confounding threats to identification
Potential threats to our identification strategy might be related to shocks that hit banks around
the time of China access in the WTO and that can affect lending decisions of banks with different
degree of exposure to China. We are particularly concerned about i) the rise in Italian banks’
cross-border funding since 2002, in the context of growing financial integration in the euro area;
ii) a sharp slowdown of GDP growth in 2002-03, reflecting the global slowdown following the
dot-com bubble and the attacks of September 11; and iii) the raise of securitisation that happened
in that period and that would affect bank liquidity and lending capacity.
Figure 6 show the raise in cross-border liabilities that Italian banks experienced since the late
2002. The foreign funding of Italian banks increased from an average slightly above e200 billion
in the period 1998-2002 (15% of GDP) toe900 billion in 2007 (56% of GDP). This increase in foreign
funding was not unique to Italy, but was common to other European periphery countries such as
Spain and Portugal and it was part of a loose global financial cycle. Our concern is that banks
more exposed to the China shock could be the ones that benefited less from these capital inflows,
so that our results are not driven by the exposure that a bank has to China, but to the boom of
international capital flows that happens around that time. Cingano and Hassan (2019) analyze the
effect of these capital inflows on bank lending and firm activities. Their preliminary findings show
that the share of foreign liabilities that a bank has on its balance sheet in the 1998-2001 period is
a valid instrument to capture the share of the overall capital inflows that a bank would get in the
2002-2007 period. In Table 10 as a robustness we run our baseline specification adding the share
of foreign liabilities pre-2001 as a control and the results are confirmed.
The second confounding factors that threatens our identification is related to the business cycle
weakness. In fact, Italy experienced a sharp slowdown of GDP in 2002-03, reflecting the post-
2001 deceleration in world trade and downward pressures in global financial markets. We are
concerned that the decrease in lending by exposed banks that we associate to the trade shock is
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actually capturing a heterogenous exposure to the GDP slowdown across banks. To control for
this, we use balance sheet data to identify the sectors that experienced a decrease in revenues in
the period 2002-03 relative to 2000-01 (i.e. the sectors more strongly subject to GDP slowdown).
We then compute the share of loans to those sectors that banks have in their portfolio and regress
it on the exposure to the China shock. We find that a 10% higher exposure to China is correlated
to a 1% higher share of exposure to the slowdown, which suggests a potential small confounding
effect. Therefore, as an additional control in Table 10, we add the average share of loans to the
declining sectors in the years 1998-2000 (interacted with a post-dummy) in the regressions and the
results hold.
The third confounding factors that threatens our identification is related to the raise in securi-
tization in the early 2000. Securitization affects the liquidity that is available to banks for lending
and other activities, so if banks exposed to China have different degree of securitized loans, our
results can be biased. To control for this, we compute the average share of securitized lending
by bank in the years 1998-2000 and add it as a control (interacted with the post-dummy) in our
baseline regression.21 Table 10 shows that also controlling for this confounding factor does not
change our results in a significant way. The last column of Table 10 controls for all these possible
confounding factors at the same time and the baseline results are confirmed. We report only the
results for the full sample, but the baseline results hold also if we distinguish between treated and
control firms.
6 Aggregate credit effects and real outcomes
Our previous estimates show a significant negative effect of bank exposure to the China shock
on the relative supply of credit to firms. However, these estimates do not necessarily imply a
negative effect on firms’ overall credit availability. Given that multiple banking is fairly common
among Italian borrowers, firms might offset the lower credit from an exposed bank with higher
credit from non-exposed banks and from new credit relationships. To assess this possibility, first,
we compute a firm-level measure of exposure to the bank lending channel as the weighted average
21As a robustness we also take the share of securitized loans in the year 2001, as the degree of securitization in the
period 1998-2000 was still relatively low.
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of the exposure of the set of banks that a firm was borrowing from pre-2001, where the weights
are the shares of credit of a specific bank relative to overall credit of the firm:
Exposure F irmi =
∑
b
ExposureIT
−i,b
Creditib
Total Crediti
(11)
Then, using this firm-level measure of exposure as the main dependent variable, we run the
following regression at the firm-year level:
lnCit = β1 Exposure F irmi × Postt + γi + αˆit + δst + ǫist (12)
The overall amount of loans received by firm i in year t is regressed on the interaction between
firm exposure and the post-2001 dummy, firm fixed effects, sector-time fixed effects and the firm-
time fixed effects estimated in Equation 7. The main challenge for specifications with aggregate
credit is to account for demand shocks at the firm-level, as firm-time fixed effects cannot be directly
included in Equation 12. Here, we follow among others Cingano et al. (2016), Bofondi et al. (2017),
Alfaro et al. (2019) and we include, in the firm-level regression, the firm-level demand shocks
(αˆit) estimated in Equation 7. Standard errors are estimated by block-bootstrapping at the the
sector-main bank level to account that firm-time fixed effects are estimated regressors. 22
Table 11 shows the 2SLS results of 11 for the relevant groups of firms. In column 1 we look
at the full sample, in column 2 we report the results for treated and control firms, in column 3
we focus on firms in sectors with comparative advantage to export and not subject to competition
from China, in column 4 to firms that have high productivity and that are in control sectors, and in
column 5 we focus on the marginal effect of firms in services.23 The coefficients are negative and
significant across all groups of firms, this implies that firms cannot fully compensate lower credit
from exposed banks with higher credit from non-exposed banks. This result is not surprising and
the literature associates it to informational frictions that prevent firms to easily switch banks in the
short-run.
22An alternative approach, as used in Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jime´nez et al. (2014), is to rely on the correlation
between supply and demand effects implied by differences between the OLS and FE estimates in Equation 7 and to
correct the estimates of the aggregate credit regressions. However, Cingano et al. (2016) show that the two approaches
are equivalent, but including the estimated demand shocks enables to easily compute appropriate standard errors and
thus to conduct inference.
23Each column refers to a different specification of Equation 12, where we actually replicate the group splits presented
in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6, but we report the coefficients only for the relevant group that we would expect to expand.
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Next, we analyze how firms’ exposure to the bank lending channel affects real outcomes such
as employment, investments, and revenues. Table 12, 13, 14 report the marginal effects of firm
exposure on these real variables controlling for firm and sector-time fixed effects. We find that
higher exposure to the bank lending channel is associated to lower employment, investments,
and revenues by firms. The effects are statistically significant and quantitatively important. For
firms in the control group (column 2) and firms in the service sector (column 5) the effects tend
to be smaller, but they are nonetheless not negligible. Noticeably, both high productive control
firms and comparative advantage control firms are negatively affected by the real effects of the
bank lending channel. These results suggests that exposure to the bank lending channel hinders
not only the reallocation of credit, but also of employment and investments, towards firms that
should not be affected by the China shock and that should actually expand.
Finally, to get a sense of the aggregate magnitude of these real effects, we follow Chodorow-
Reich (2014) and consider a counter-factual scenario in which firms’ exposure to the bank lending
channel is equal to the bottom 10% of firms exposed. In other words, we assign this counter-factual
threshold to all firms with higher exposure than the threshold (i.e. Exposure F irmCFi <= 0.25 for
all firms). We derive the counter-factual outcome for each variable Yit (employment, investments
and revenues) as the outcome that would have occurred if all firms had exposure equal to the
counterfactual one:
Ŷ CFit − Ŷit = β̂1 ∗ (Exposure F irm
CF
i − Exposure F irmi) (13)
where β̂1 is the marginal effect of bank exposure on the outcome variable presented in Tables 12,
13, 14, where we distinguish between treated and control firms.
Total losses in the sample are then equal to the sum - across treated and control firms in the
sample - of the difference between the counter-factual outcome and the fitted value outcome:
Aggr Losses =
∑
i
(Ŷ CFit − Ŷit) (14)
In the case of employment, aggregate losses over the period amount to between 1.2% and 3.0%
percentage points. For investments and revenues, the confidence interval is between 1.4% and
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3.5%percentage points. There are two main caveats. First, this is a partial equilibrium approach,
which assumes total effects to be equal to the sum of direct effects measured at each firm. Second,
these estimates refer to the aggregate effects in the sample, which may differ from the aggregate
effects in the entire population of firms. Importantly, about two-thirds of these effects come from
treated firms, whereas control firms accounts for one-third of the total effect. The decline of em-
ployment and investments by treated firms is something that eventually may have happened in
any case given their exposure to competition from China. Therefore, it is hard to asses the norma-
tive implications for the decline of these firms. However, the negative impact on real variables for
control firms is the highlight of the negative implication of bank exposure to a trade shock.
7 The underlying mechanism: bank exposure to China shock and NPL
In this section we investigate the mechanism that links the trade shock that hit firms in certain
sectors with the patterns of credit allocation of banks particularly exposed to these firms. To do
so we exploit detailed information on banks’ balance sheet. Figure 7 reports the evolution of the
value of non-performing loans of firms in sectors subject to competition from China above or
below median. We see that the patterns of non-performing loans across the two groups diverge
remarkably in the years after 2003. They both spike in 2003 due to the GDP slowdown of Italy,
but for control firms they decline remarkably after that. For firms in sectors above median the
aggregate value of non-performing loans turns to be 40% higher in the period 2002-2007 relative
to the years 1998-2002.
In order to test more formally the link between bank exposure and NPLs, we run the following
specification:
NPLs Ratiobt = β1 Exposure
IT
b × Postt +X
′
bδ × Postt + γb + αt + ǫbt (15)
the dependent variable is the share of non-performing loans on total assets in banks’ balance
sheet. This is regressed on our measure of bank exposure as defined in Equation 3, which as
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usual is instrumented with Equation 6. We also control for a vector of bank characteristics pre-
2002 (interacted with a dummy for the years post 2002), bank fixed effect and time dummies; we
cluster the standard errors at the bank level.
Table 15 (column 1) shows that a 10p.p. higher bank exposure to the trade shock is associated
with a 0.3p.p. increase in the NPLs’ ratio, which is equivalent to a 18% increase in NPLs for
the average bank. This suggests that indeed the raise in NPLs can be an important channel that
explain the contraction in credit supply by exposed banks. In order to analyze this point further,
we replicate our baseline regression adding an interaction term of lagged NPL ratio with bank
exposure such that:
In order to investigate this further, we look at the relation of bank exposurewith other key bank
balance sheet variables, such as bank deposits, interbank funding, and core capital by running
bank level estimates as in Equation 15. Table 15 shows that bank exposure to the China shock
is neither associated with a response of deposits by households and firms, nor does it affect the
funding the bank receives on the interbank market. However, we find that more exposed banks
suffer a decrease in the core capital ratio, which is of similar magnitude as the raise in the NPL
ratio.
The findings in Table 15 suggests that banks more exposed to China suffer from higher NPLs,
which lead to a contraction in their core capital and affect the lending capacity of banks. If this
were the main mechanism, we should observe that the effect of bank exposure to China on the
supply of credit is lower for banks with a higher buffer relative to the regulatory threshold of
capital requirement. To test for this hypothesis, we run the baseline specification in Equation 7
interacting bank exposure with the 1998-2000 average of tier 1 capital ratio of banks relative to
their risk-weighted assets, which had a minimum requirement of 6%. This variable is a proxy for
the lending space that banks can have in case they are hit by a negative shock. The results in Table
16 shows a positive coefficient of bank exposure to China interacted with the tier 1 capital ratio
and this is significant for the full sample and for firms in the control group. The estimates imply
that for banks with a tier 1 ratio above 11%, which corresponds to the top quintile of banks in
the sample, bank exposure to the China shock no longer has a significant negative effect on the
supply of credit. These results are consistent with the idea that banks’ lending capacity is key for
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understanding the driver of bank exposure to the China shock and the supply of credit.
To better understand the mechanism of our findings, we replicate the baseline results of Equa-
tion 7 by type of bank. We distinguish in particular between standard private banks, branches of
foreign banks operating in Italy, cooperative banks, and mutual banks. As Table 17 shows private
banks are the ones that provide the highest share of credit, followed by cooperative banks, foreign
banks and mutual banks. All type of banks have similar degree of exposure to the China shock.
Finally, mutual banks are the ones that tend to be more concentrated in specific geographic areas.
Table 18 shows that the baseline results are confirmed for private, cooperative banks, and, to
some extent, mutual banks. However, foreign banks behave differently. They increase lending
to treated firms helping them leaning against the wind and they do not change significantly their
lending towards control firms. Table 19 shows that foreign banksmore exposed to the China shock
do not face an increase in NPLs (as treated firms are still being financed) and they do not suffer
from a contraction in core capital. Foreign banks typically face lower costs of funding, as they can
access funds from their headquarter abroad. This again confirms that the availability of funds for
banks for exposed to the China shock is a key drivers of our results.
Overall the results suggest that firms that are subject to stronger competition from China in-
crease their NPLs hitting the banks they borrow from. These banks suffer from a contraction in
their core capital and, unless they entered the shock period with a buffer of tier 1 capital ratio well
above the regulatory requirement, their overall funding capacity decreases and this leads them to
cut credit.
8 Concluding Remarks
This study shows that credit allocation in the aftermath of a trade shock is a novel and impor-
tant channel that can affect gains from trade. We find evidence of endogenous financial frictions
that arise from trade liberalization and spillovers between losers and winners from trade that go
through banks and hinder the reallocation channel after a trade shock. Focusing on China access
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into the WTO as an exogenous shock and using detailed credit, firm, and bank data for Italy, we
find that banks that were exposed to borrowers that turn to be hit by competition from China
decrease their lending relative to less exposed banks. Importantly, the negative effect on the rela-
tive supply of credit affects not only firms that are directly subject to competition from China, but
also firms that are not affected by China and that should actually expand, including high produc-
tivity firms within sectors, firms in services, and firms in sectors where Italy has a comparative
advantage to export.
We find that firms are unable to hedge against lower credit from exposed banks by borrowing
more from non-exposed banks; so, the aggregate credit of firms linked to exposed banks decreases
relative to other firms. This translates into real negative effects on employment, investments, and
firm revenues and it has relevant aggregate effects. The main channel goes through the role of
NPLs: as import competition from China leads to higher NPLs of firms, the balance sheet of
exposed banks suffers losses that lead to an erosion of their core capital, which decreases their
lending capacity. As a validation of this explanation, we find that exposed banks with a higher
buffer in their tier-1 capital ratio on the onset of the shock implement a lower reduction of credit.
Future research should continue theoretical and empirical investigations on the role of credit for
gains from trade and on the reallocation channel, studying its interaction with other frictions in
the economy, and finding policy solutions that may mitigate its impact.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Unit Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75
Bank characteristics
Total Assets eMillions 4,701 36,002 109 229 535
Liquid Assets % Assets 30.5 14.1 21.8 27.9 37.9
Nonperforming Loans % Assets 2.6 2.6 1.1 1.9 3.3
Credit to Firms % Assets 37.6 13.1 28.8 39.3 47.3
Profits % Assets 1 0.5 0.7 1 1.2
Core capital % Assets 1.4 3.2 0.01 0.2 1.5
Core Funding %Liabilities 52.5 17.7 44.4 51.9 64.4
Bank exposure to China % Loans 35.8 21.8 21.8 35 48
Firm characteristics
Bank Credit eMillions 0.82 3.74 0.27 0.38 0.57
Revenues eThousands 4,173 5,673 743 1,751 4,708
Fixed Assets eThousands 870 1,388 71 258 928
Gross operating margin % Revenues 7.9 2.4 7.1 7.6 8.3
Credit Score Units 5.4 0.6 5.1 5.4 5.7
Note: The table reports relevant statistics (1998-2007, average) of banks and firms in
the firm-bank matched sample. Bank balance sheet data are from the Supervisory
Reports submitted by banks to the Bank of Italy. Credit data are from the Italian
Credit Register. Firm balance sheet data are from CERVED. Liquid assets include
cash, interbank deposits, and bond holdings. Core funding refers to deposits. Firms’
credit score is computed by CERVED based on past defaults and firms’ balance sheet
information.
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Table 2: Balancing tests
Exposed Banks Non-exposed banks Normalized
Unit Mean S.D. Mean S.D. difference
Bank characteristics
Total Assets eMillions 5,780 3,671 3,430 1,228 0.22
Liquid Assets % Assets 18.5 11.7 19.9 11.9 -0.12
Nonperforming Loans % Assets 3.2 4.9 3.3 3.5 -0.02
Credit to Firms % Assets 39.9 13.9 38.0 14.2 0.13
Profits % Assets 1.5 0.8 1.8 2.4 -0.16
Core capital % Assets 2.1 5.1 1.6 5.9 0.09
Core Funding %Liabilities 55.5 19.4 60.3 18.2 -0.25
Borrower characteristics
Bank Credit eMillions 0.80 2.1 0.84 4.8 -0.01
Revenues eThousands 5,230 3,780 4,864 3,942 0.09
Fixed Assets eThousands 1,337 1,050 1,387 1,070 -0.04
Gross operating margin % Revenues 7.9 6.9 8.3 2.5 -0.07
Credit Score Units 5.3 0.6 5.4 0.7 -0.09
Note: The table reports relevant balance sheet characteristics of banks and of their average bor-
rower (1998-2000 average), dividing the sample between exposed and non-exposed banks. Ex-
posed (non-exposed) banks have a share of loans to firms subject to competition from China
above (below) median over the period 1998-2000. The last column shows the Normalized differ-
ence between the two groups as specified in Imbens and Wooldridge (2008); an absolute value
above 0.25 indicates an imbalance between the two groups.
35
Table 3: Baseline results
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.078*** -0.11***
(0.008) (0.014)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Controli -0.075*** -0.10***
(0.009) (0.015)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi -0.082*** -0.11***
(0.012) (0.024)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt 0.65***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Controli 0.68***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi 0.54***
(0.03)
AR-Wald test, F 32.1 28.3
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 (Columns 1
and 2) and in Equation 8 (Columns 3 and 4). In Columns 3 and 4 firms are grouped into
treated and control, according to the degree of exposure to Chinese competition of their
sector as defined in Equation 4 (above and below median split). The dependent variable
is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt. The variable
ExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined in Equa-
tion 3. In columns (2) and (4) this is instrumented with the variable ExposureOC
−i,b, where
bank exposure is defined using imports from China of other advanced countries, as defined
in Equation 6. Specbst is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the
bank specializes its lending activities. Bank controls include bank characteristics pre-2001
interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio,
and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies.
Standard errors are double clustered at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1%
level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 4: Baseline results: comparative advantage
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Comp. Advantagei -0.075*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.018)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Comp. Adv. Controli -0.061*** -0.092***
(0.011) (0.018)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Comp. Adv. Treatedi -0.083*** -0.095***
(0.016) (0.03)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Comp. Disadvantagei -0.086*** -0.093*** -0.085*** -0.092***
(0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.02)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Comp. Advantagei 0.60***
(0.03)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Comp. Adv. Controli 0.70***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Comp. Adv. Treatedi 0.53***
(0.04)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Comp. Disadvantagei 0.68*** 0.68***
(0.02) (0.02)
AR-Wald test, F 22 15.8
Observations 1,740,734 1,740,734 1,740,734 1,740,734
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 8 and firms are grouped ac-
cording to the comparative advantage and competition from China of their sector. Comparative advantage
firms are those in sectors where the Balassa (bounded) index of revealed comparative advantage is above 0.
Control (treated) firms are those in sectors with exposure to China below (above) median as defined in Equa-
tion 4. The dependent variable is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt.
The variable ExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined in Equation
3 and it instrumented with the variable ExposureOC
−i,b, where bank exposure is defined using imports from
China of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. Other bank controls include bank character-
istics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio,
and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank dummies, and a dummy that
captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are
double clustered at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *
significant at the 10% level.
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Table 5: Baseline results: firm productivity
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt ×High Productivityi -0.078*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.018)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt ×High Prod. Controli -0.066*** -0.115***
(0.011) (0.018)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt ×High Prod. Treatedi -0.092*** -0.124**
(0.016) (0.03)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Low Productivityi -0.078*** -0.095*** -0.078*** -0.095***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt ×High Productivityi 0.61***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt ×High Prod. Controli -0.68***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt ×High Prod. Treatedi 0.55***
(0.04)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Low Productivityi 0.64*** 0.64***
(0.02) (0.02)
AR-Wald test, F 24.8 18.6
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 8 and firms are grouped
according to their productivity and to competition fromChina of their sector. High (low) productivity firms
are those with a log TFPR above (below) their sectoral average for the period 1998-2000. Control (treated)
firms are those in sectors with exposure to China below (above) median as defined in Equation 4. The
dependent variable is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt. The variable
ExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined in Equation 3 and it
instrumented with the variable ExposureOC
−i,b, where bank exposure is defined using imports from China
of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. Other bank controls include bank characteristics
pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and
the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank dummies, and a dummy that
captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors
are double clustered at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level,
* significant at the 10% level.
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Table 6: Baseline results: services vs. manufacturing
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2)
OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Servicesi -0.061*** -0.06***
(0.005) (0.009)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt ×Manufacturingi -0.068*** -0.086***
(0.006) (0.01)
Bank-firm specialization X X
Bank controls X X
Firm-time F.E. X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X
Instrument First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Servicesi 0.77***
(0.01)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt ×Manufacturingi 0.72***
(0.02)
AR-Wald test, F 18.2
Observations 3,584,419 3,584,419
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equa-
tion 8 and firms are grouped between services and manufacturing. The de-
pendent variable is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in
year t, lnCibt. The variable Exposure
IT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s
entrance in the WTO, as defined in Equation 3 and it instrumented with the
variable ExposureOC
−i,b, where bank exposure is defined using imports from
China of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. Other bank
controls include bank characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001
dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capi-
tal ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank dummies,
and a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank
specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are double clustered at the
bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5%
level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7: Firms entry and exit (2SLS)
Dependent: Entryib & Exitib Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.059*** -0.011*
(0.008) (0.005)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Controli -0.037*** -0.002
(0.01) (0.006)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi -0.086*** -0.021**
(0.01) (0.009)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm F.E. X X X X
Time F.E. X X X X
First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt 0.60*** 0.60***
(0.014) (0.014)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Controli 0.65*** 0.65***
(0.016) (0.015)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi 0.59*** 0.59***
(0.022) (0.022)
AR-Wald test, F 44.8 24.1 3.6 2.5
Observations 416,549 416,549 416,549 416,549
Adj.R2 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the extensive margin specification in
Equation 10. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if firm
i starts (entry) or ends (exit) a credit relation with bank b after China’s entrance to
the WTO. The variable ExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s entrance
in the WTO, as defined in Equation 3 and this is instrumented with the variable
ExposureOC
−i,b, where bank exposure is defined using imports from China of other
advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. Other bank controls include bank
characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets,
share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include
firm fixed effects, year dummies, and a dummy that captures if a firm operates
in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors
are double clustered at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, **
significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
40
Table 8: Bank exposure accounting for upstream linkages
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.056*** -0.072***
(0.007) (0.016)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Controli -0.053*** -0.080***
(0.009) (0.020)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi -0.061*** -0.059**
(0.012) (0.024)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt 0.60***
(0.03)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Controli 0.61***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi 0.56***
(0.05)
AR-Wald test, F 19.2 10.1
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of Equation 7 (Columns 1 and 2) and Equation 8
(Columns 3 and 4), where bank exposure is based on sectors’ sum of direct and upstream
exposure to the China shock. In Columns 3 and 4 firms are grouped into treated and control,
according to the degree of direct and upstream exposure to Chinese competition of their sec-
tor (above and below median split). The dependent variable is the log of outstanding credit
between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt. The variable Exposure
IT
−i,b captures bank expo-
sure to China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined in Equation 3. In columns (2) and (4) this is
instrumented with the variableExposureOC
−i,b, where bank exposure is defined using imports
from China of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. Specbst is a dummy that
captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Bank
controls include bank characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are
log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include
firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies. Standard errors are double clustered at the
bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant
at the 10% level.
41
Table 9: Geographical heterogeneity
Dependent variable: lnCibt High exposed provinces Low exposed provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Treated vs. Control Full sample Treated vs. Control
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.122*** -0.097***
(0.022) (0.016)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Controli -0.118*** -0.092***
(0.02) (0.019)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi -0.128*** -0.104***
(0.039) (0.025)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-Time F.E. X X X X
Firm-Bank F.E. X X X X
First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt 0.54*** 0.68***
(0.02) (0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Controli 0.60*** 0.75***
(0.024) (0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi 0.50*** 0.61***
(0.046) (0.04)
AR-Wald test, F 26.1 15.8 32.3 16.8
Observations 1,006,653 1,006,653 937,021 937,021
Adj.R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and in Equation 8, but we split the
sample of firms by the exposure to competition from China of their province. We compute a province exposure as the
value-added weighted average of its sectors’ exposure to the China shock as defined in Equation 4 and we divide the
sample between firms in provinces that are above and below median of exposure. The dependent variable is the log of
outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt. The variable Exposure
IT
−i,b captures bank exposure to
China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined in Equation 3 and this is instrumented with the variable ExposureOC
−i,b, where
bank exposure is defined using imports from China of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. Other bank
controls include bank characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs,
core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank dummies, and a dummy
that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are double
clustered at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10%
level.
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Table 10: Robustness to potential confounding factors (2SLS, full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: lnCibt Baseline Foreign funding Recession Securitization All
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.11*** -0.116*** -0.108*** -0.109*** -0.105***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Foreign Funding Shareb × Postt 0.24*** 0.10**
(0.06) (0.05)
Recession Shareb × Postt -0.11** -0.20***
(0.05) (0.05)
Securitization Shareb × Postt -0.96*** -1.01***
(0.08) (0.09)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X X
Bank controls X X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X X
Firm.bank F.E. X X X X X
First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt 0.65*** 0.60*** 0.58*** 0.60*** 0.58***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
AR-Wald test, F 32.1 73.2 55.9 62.7 51.5
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 to which we add controls for
potential confounding factors. The dependent variable is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i
in year t, lnCibt. Results are for the full sample of firms, but they deliver similar results if we look at treated and
control firms. The variable ExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined
in Equation 3 and this is instrumented with the variable ExposureOC
−i,b, where bank exposure is defined using
imports from China of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. Other bank controls include bank
characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding
ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank dummies, and a dummy
that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors
are double clustered at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *
significant at the 10% level.
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Table 11: Effects on firms’ total credit (2SLS)
Dependent: lnCit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full-sample Control Treated Comparative High Product. Services
Adv. Control Control
ExposureITi × Postt -0.083*** -0.071*** -0.096*** -0.068** -0.093*** -0.12**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.052)
Credit demand X X X X X X
Bank controls X X X X X X
Firm-F.E. X X X X X X
Sector-time F.E. X X X X X X
First stage
ExposureOCi × Postt 0.65*** 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.93*** 1.1*** 0.65***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.012)
AR-Wald test, F 34.3 18.2 10.9 19.2 24.2
Observations 451,145 451,145 400,886 451,145 899,397
Adj.R2 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the aggregate specification in Equation 12 by looking at the marginal
effects for different groups of firms. In Columns 3 to 5 we show the marginal effect for the relevant group of firms
of the respective regressions (the full results for each column are available upon request). The dependent variable
is the log of total outstanding credit of firm i in year t, lnCit. We split the sample between firms that are in sector
whose exposure to China competition is above median (treated firms) and below median (control firms), as defined
in Equation 1. The variable ExposureITi captures a loan-size weighted average of firm exposure to treated banks
as defined in Equation 11 and this is instrumented by measuring bank treatment using imports from China of other
advanced countries. All regressions include firm fixed effects, sector-time dummies, and the firm-time fixed effects
estimated in Equation 7 as a proxy of credit demand, a vector of weighted average lender characteristics pre-2001
(log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the sector-main
bank level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 12: Real effects on firms: employment
Dependent: lnCit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full-sample Control Treated Comparative High Product. Services
Adv. Control Control
ExposureITi × Postt -0.082*** -0.061*** -0.11*** -0.064** -0.12*** -0.039***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Firm-F.E. X X X X X X
Sector-time F.E. X X X X X X
First stage
ExposureOCi × Postt 0.68*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.90*** 1.14*** 0.65***
(0.02) (0.028) (0.038) (0.04) (0.02) (0.12)
AR-Wald test, F 20.8 11.5 7.4 43.3 19.5
Observations 451,145 451,145 400,886 451,145 899,397
Adj.R2 0.96 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.90
Note: The table reports the marginal effect of firms’ exposure to the bank lending channel of the trade shock on
the log of total employment. The explanatory variable ExposureITi captures a loan-size weighted average of firm
exposure to treated banks as defined in Equation 11 and this is instrumented by measuring bank treatment using
imports from China of other advanced countries. Control (treated) firms are those in sectors with exposure to China
below (above) median as defined in Equation 4. All regressions include firm fixed effects, sector-time fixed effects,
and a weighted average of firms’ lenders characteristics pre-2001 (log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio,
and the capital ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the sector-main bank level. ***significant at the 1% level, **
significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 13: Real effects on firms: investments
Dependent: lnCit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full-sample Control Treated Comparative High Product. Services
Adv. Control Control
ExposureITi × Postt -0.11*** -0.075*** -0.17*** -0.09** -0.15*** -0.026
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Firm-F.E. X X X X X X
Sector-time F.E. X X X X X X
First stage
ExposureOCi × Postt 0.68*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 0.90*** 1.14*** 0.66***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.11)
AR-Wald test, F 26.1 11.8 6.4 31.3 14.2
Observations 451,145 451,145 400,886 451,145 899,397
Adj.R2 0.96 0.987 0.88 0.88 0.87
Note: The table reports the marginal effect of firms’ exposure to the bank lending channel of the trade shock on the
log of investment. The explanatory variable ExposureITi captures a loan-size weighted average of firm exposure
to treated banks as defined in Equation 11 and this is instrumented by measuring bank treatment using imports
from China of other advanced countries. Control (treated) firms are those in sectors with exposure to China below
(above) median as defined in Equation 4. All regressions include firm fixed effects, sector-time fixed effects, and a
weighted average of firms’ lenders characteristics pre-2001 (log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the
capital ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the sector-main bank level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant
at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 14: Real effects on firms: revenues
Dependent: lnCit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full-sample Control Treated Comparative High Product. Services
Adv. Control Control
ExposureITi × Postt -0.10*** -0.06** -0.16*** -0.076** -0.13*** -0.034
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Firm-F.E. X X X X X X
Sector-time F.E. X X X X X X
First stage
ExposureOCi × Postt 0.68*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 0.90*** 1.14*** 0.66***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
AR-Wald test, F 25.8 13.8 8.6 35.7 12.4
Observations 451,145 451,145 400,886 451,145 899,397
Adj.R2 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.88 0.84
Note: The table reports the marginal effect of firms’ exposure to the bank lending channel of the trade shock on
the log of revenues. The explanatory variable ExposureITi captures a loan-size weighted average of firm exposure
to treated banks as defined in Equation 11 and this is instrumented by measuring bank treatment using imports
from China of other advanced countries. Control (treated) firms are those in sectors with exposure to China below
(above) median as defined in Equation 4. All regressions include firm fixed effects, sector-time fixed effects, and a
weighted average of firms’ lenders characteristics pre-2001 (log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the
capital ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the sector-main bank level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant
at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 15: Bank exposure and balance sheet effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: NPLs Core funding Interbank Core capital
ExposureITb × Postt 0.03*** -0.01 0.02 -0.034**
(0.008) (0.02) -0.012 -0.015
Bank controls X X X X
Bank F.E. X X X X
Time F.E. X X X X
First stage
ExposureOCb × Postt 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48***
(0.02) (0.02) -0.02 -0.02
K-P Wald rk F 57 57 57 57
Observations 5,014 5,014 5,014 5,014
Adj.R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Note: The table reports the coefficients of a specification similar to Equation
15, where various source of funding of banks are the dependent variables.
These are i) the core funding (deposits), ii) domestic interbank lending, iii) for-
eign funding, iv) core capital. All variables are expressed as a share of bank
overall liabilities. The variable ExposureITb captures bank exposure to China’s
entrance in the WTO, as defined in Equation 3 and this is instrumented with
the variable ExposureOCb , where bank exposure is defined using imports from
China of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. Other bank con-
trols include bank characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy,
these are log-assets, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions
include bank fixed effects and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at
the bank level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *
significant at the 10% level.
48
Table 16: Baseline results: the interaction with Tier 1 capital ratio (2SLS)
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: lnCibt Full-sample Control firms Treated firms
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.217*** -0.24*** -0.19***
(0.028) (0.03) (0.05)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × T ier 1 Ratiob 1.74*** 1.98*** 1.56**
(0.37) (0.42) (0.68)
T ier 1 Ratiob × Postt 0.31 0.15 0.16
(0.22) (0.23) (0.44)
Bank-firm specialization X X X
Bank controls X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X
Firm.bank F.E. X X X
First stage
AR-Wald test, F 20.1 14
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.87 0.90
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specifications in Equation 7 and 8 by
adding an interaction term with the Tier 1 Ratio of banks. We look at the full sample (spec-
ification 1) and distinguishing treated and control firms (specification 2). The dependent
variable is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt. The
variableExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined
in Equation 3 and this is instrumented by measuring bank treatment using imports from
China of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. T ier 1 Ratiob captures the
ratio of banks’ Tier 1 capital on their risk weighted assets as an average of the 1998-2000
period. Bank controls include bank characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001
dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All
regressions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies. Standard errors are
double clustered at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant
at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
Table 17: Bank relevance and exposure
Market share (pre-2002) Average exposure to China
Private banks 0.69 0.39
(0.19)
Foreign banks 0.05 0.41
(0.27)
Cooperative banks 0.23 0.42
(0.13)
Mutual banks 0.03 0.34
(0.22)
Note: The table reports the market shares and the average exposure to China of differ-
ent type of banks: standard private banks, foreign banks operating in Italy, cooperative
banks, and mutual banks.
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Table 18: Baseline effects on credit by bank type
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: lnCibt Full-sample Control firms Treated firms
Private Banks -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.131***
(0.018) (0.02) (0.02)
Foreign Banks 0.22** -0.35 0.305***
(0.09) (0.26) (0.10)
Cooperative Banks -0.145*** -0.13*** -0.165***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025)
Mutual Banks -0.037** -0.042* -0.03
(0.018) (0.023) (0.027)
Bank-firm specialization X X X
Bank controls X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X
First stage
AR-Wald test, F 24.1 16.2
Observations 1,945,334 15.3
Adj.R2 0.87 0.90
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7
by bank type (standard private banks, foreign banks operating in Italy, cooperative
banks, and mutual banks). The dependent variable is the log of outstanding credit
between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt. In specification (1) we look at the full
sample and in in (2) we distinguish the effect for treated and control firms. The vari-
ableExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s entrance in theWTO, as defined
in Equation 3. This is instrumented with the variable ExposureOC
−i,b, where bank ex-
posure is defined using imports from China of other advanced countries, as defined
in Equation 6. Bank controls include bank characteristics pre-2001 interacted with
a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the
capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank dummies, and
a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its
lending activities. Standard errors are double clustered at the bank and sector level.
***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10%
level.
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Table 19: Balance sheet effects by bank type
Dependent variable: NPLs Core Capital
Private banks 0.024*** -0.066***
(0.007) (0.01)
Foreign banks 0.05 -0.05
(0.037) (0.023)
Cooperative banks 0.037*** -0.056***
(0.006) (0.016)
Mutual banks 0.047*** -0.018
(0.006) (0.014)
Bank controls X X
Bank F.E. X X
Time F.E. X X
First stage
AR-Wald test, F 20.27 46.59
Observations 4,965 4,965
Adj.R2 0.61 0.61
Note: The table reports the coefficients of a specifica-
tion similar to Equation 15, where NPLs and Core cap-
ital are the two dependent variables. Results are pre-
sented by bank type (standard private banks, foreign
banks operating in Italy, cooperative banks, and mu-
tual banks). The variable ExposureITb captures bank
exposure to China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined
in Equation 3 and this is instrumented with the vari-
able ExposureOCb , where bank exposure is defined us-
ing imports from China of other advanced countries,
as defined in Equation 6. Other bank controls include
bank characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-
2001 dummy, these are log-assets, core-funding ratio,
and the capital ratio. All regressions include bank
fixed effects and year dummies. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. ***significant at the 1%
level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the
10% level.
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Figure 1: Italian Import and Export Shares, from and to China
Note: The figure reports the evolution of the share of exports and imports of Italy to and from China relative to total
Italian exports and imports. Data from COMTRADE.
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Figure 2: Bank exposure: density distribution
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Note: The figure reports the distribution of values of bank exposure to China access in the WTO as defined in Equation
3. Data from the credit registry of the Bank of Italy.
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Figure 3: Aggregate credit, exposed vs. non-exposed banks
Note: The figure reports the evolution of the total outstanding credit of exposed and non-exposed banks. Bank exposure
is defined as in Equation 3 and we divide the sample of banks above and below median of that measure.
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Figure 4: Aggregate credit, exposed vs. non-exposed banks & treated vs. control firms
Note: The figure reports the evolution of the total outstanding credit of exposed and non-exposed banks give to treated
(T.) and control (N.T.) firms. Bank exposure is defined as in Equation 3 and we divide the sample of banks above and
below median of that measure. Firms are defined to be in the treatment or control group according to whether they are
in a sector subject to China competition above or below median as defined in Equation 2
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Figure 5: Dynamic Diff-in-Diff (95% CI)
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Note: The figure reports the coefficients of the dynamic diff-in-diff regression specified in Equation 9 with 95% confi-
dence interval. The coefficients represent the marginal effect of bank exposure on credit for each year in our sample,
taking the year 2001 as baseline (when China joined the WTO). Results are for the full sample of firms, but they are
similar if we split the sample between treated and control firms. The variable ExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure
to China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined in Equation 3 and this is instrumented with the variable ExposureOC
−i,b,
where bank exposure is defined using imports from China of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. We
have other controls for bank characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a year dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs,
core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank dummies, and a
dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors
are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level.
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Figure 6: Possible confounding factor: cross-border capital flows
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Note: The figure reports the evolution of the total outstanding liabilities of Italian banks towards foreign counterparts.
Data: Bank of International Settlement.
Figure 7: The underlying mechanism: the role of NPLs
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Note: The figure reports the evolution of the total amount of NPLs of firms operating in exposed and non-exposed
sectors to China competition. Sector exposure is defined as in Equation 2. The average value of NPLs before 2001 is
normalized to 100.
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Appendix
Baseline results with alternative variables and specifications
This Appendix reports the baseline results with alternative variables and specifications.
Table A1 reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and 8, where, in
order to measure bank exposure, we do not divide sectors between treated and control using
a median cutoff, but rather use a continuous measure for sector exposure to competition from
China.
Table A2 reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and 8, where bank
exposure is instrumented using imports from China of the United States only rather than a group
of advanced countries.
Table A3 reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and 8, where bank
exposure is measured as the ratio of loans to firms subject to competition from China relative to
banks’ total assets rather than on banks’ overall loans to non-financial corporations.
Table A4 reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and 8, where bank
exposure is defined by leaving out the sector where the firm operates.
Table A5 reports the coefficients of a first-difference transformation of the baseline Equation 7
and 8.
Table A6 reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and 8, where obser-
vations are weighted by the log-employment of firms.
Table A7 reports shift-share IV coefficients that are obtained from a weighted IV regression at
the industry level, as in Borusyak et al. (2018)). Standard errors allow for clustering at the level of
four-digit sector and are valid in the framework of Adao, Kolesar and Morales (2018) (Table A7).
Figure A1 provides a visual representation of the identifying variation at the industry-level.
Since our baseline specification where bank exposure is defined using a median cutoff between
treated and control sectors does not easily lend to a visual representation of the identifying vari-
ation, we define bank exposure using a continuous measure for sector exposure to competition
from China (as in Table A1). The figure plots binned scatterplots of industry-level outcome and
treatment residuals against a continuous measure of sector exposure to competition from China
(as in Borusyak et al. (2018)). Outcome and treatment residuals are obtained from a regression
which includes the same controls as in the baseline specification and are then averaged for the
pre- and post-2001 periods; the difference between pre- and post-2001 average is then taken for
both outcome and treatment residuals. The lower panel of figure A1 replicates the same visual
analysis excluding outliers (i.e. sectors in the bin with the largest value of industry China shock).
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Table A1: Baseline results with a continuous measure of firms’ treatment
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.050*** -0.049***
(0.008) (0.014)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Controli -0.073*** -0.088***
(0.011) (0.016)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi -0.026** -0.015
(0.012) (0.021)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
Instrument: ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt 1.04***
(0.09)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Controli 1.23***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi 0.92***
(0.12)
F-Stat 8.5 15.4
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and
8, where, in order to measure bank exposure, we do not divide sectors between treated
and control using a median cutoff, but rather use a continuous measure for sector ex-
posure to competition from China. The dependent variable is the log of outstanding
credit between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt. We split the sample between firms
that are in sector whose exposure to China competition is above median (treated firms)
and belowmedian (control firms), as defined in Equation 1. The variableExposureIT
−i,b
is instrumented with the variableExposureOC
−i,b, where bank exposure is defined using
imports from China of other advanced countries. Bank controls include bank char-
acteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of
NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed
effects, firm-bank dummies, and a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in
which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are double clustered
at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level,
* significant at the 10% level.
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Table A2: Baseline results with instrument based on U.S. imports only
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.078*** -0.089***
(0.008) (0.014)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Controli -0.075*** -0.084***
(0.009) (0.014)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi -0.082*** -0.088**
(0.012) (0.023)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
Instrument: ExposureUS
−i,b × Postt First stage
ExposureUS
−i,b × Postt 0.63***
(0.02)
ExposureUS
−i,b × Postt × Controli 0.69***
(0.02)
ExposureUS
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi 0.58***
(0.03)
F-Stat 36.4 21.3
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and
8, where bank exposure is instrumented using imports from China of the United States
only rather than a group of advanced countries. The dependent variable is the log of
outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt. We split the sample
between firms that are in sector whose exposure to China competition is above median
(treated firms) and belowmedian (control firms), as defined in Equation 1. The variable
ExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s entrance in the WTO, as defined in
Equation 3. In columns (2) and (4) this is instrumented with the variableExposureUS
−i,b,
where bank exposure is defined using imports from China of the United States (instead
of a group of advanced economies as in Equation 6). Bank controls include bank char-
acteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of
NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed
effects, firm-bank dummies, and a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in
which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are double clustered
at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level,
* significant at the 10% level.
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Table A3: Baseline results with exposure relative to bank total assets
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.064*** -0.066***
(0.004) (0.004)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Controli -0.059*** -0.061***
(0.004) (0.005)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi -0.068*** -0.070***
(0.005) (0.005)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
Instrument: ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt 1.02***
(0.01)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Controli 0.99***
(0.01)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi 1.03***
(0.01)
F-Stat 261.1 132.6
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and
8, where bank exposure is measured as the ratio of loans to firms subject to competition
from China on banks’ total assets rather than on banks’ overall loans. The dependent
variable is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt.
We split the sample between firms that are in sector whose exposure to China compe-
tition is above median (treated firms) and below median (control firms), as defined in
Equation 1. The variable ExposureITb captures bank exposure to China’s entrance in
the WTO, similarly to definition in Equation 3 but using banks’ total assets in the de-
nominator. In columns (2) and (4) this is instrumented with the variable ExposureOCb ,
where bank exposure is defined using imports from China of other advanced coun-
tries, as defined in Equation 6. Bank controls include bank characteristics pre-2001
interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding
ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank
dummies, and a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank
specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are double clustered at the bank and
sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at
the 10% level.
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Table A4: Baseline results with bank exposure leaving sectoral credit out
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.078*** -0.103***
(0.008) (0.015)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Controli -0.078*** -0.100***
(0.012) (0.009)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi -0.078*** -0.105***
(0.024) (0.015)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
Instrument: ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt 0.61***
(0.01)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Controli 0.69***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi 0.55***
(0.03)
F-Stat 47.3 26.6
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and
8, where bank exposure is defined by leaving out the sector where the firm operates.
The dependent variable is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i
in year t, lnCibt. We split the sample between firms that are in sector whose expo-
sure to China competition is above median (treated firms) and below median (con-
trol firms), as defined in Equation 1. The variable ExposureIT
−s,b is instrumented with
ExposureOC
−s,b, where bank exposure is defined using imports from China of other ad-
vanced economies as in Equation 6). Bank controls include bank characteristics pre-
2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-
funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects,
firm-bank dummies, and a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which
the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are double clustered at the
bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *
significant at the 10% level.
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Table A5: Baseline results: First differences
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b -0.077*** -0.093***
(0.007) (0.014)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Controli -0.073*** -0.08***
(0.011) (0.024)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Treatedi -0.081*** -0.102***
(0.01) (0.016)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
Instrument: ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b 0.61***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Controli 0.55***
(0.03)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Treatedi 0.67***
(0.02)
AR-Wald test, F 12.1 7.3
Observations 188,664 188,664 188,664 188,664
Adj.R2 0.19 0.41 0.19 0.41
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7
and 8. The dependent variable is the change in the log of outstanding credit between
bank b and firm i between the average of 1998-2001 and that of 2002-2007, ∆ lnCib.
We split the sample between firms that are in sector whose exposure to China com-
petition is above median (treated firms) and below median (control firms), as de-
fined in Equation 1. The variable ExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s
entrance in the WTO, as defined in Equation 3. In columns (2) and (4) this is in-
strumented with the variable ExposureOC
−i,b, where bank exposure is defined using
imports from China of other advanced countries, as defined in Equation 6. Bank con-
trols include bank characteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these
are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regres-
sions include firm fixed effects, and a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a
sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are double
clustered at the bank and sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at
the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table A6: Baseline results: Weighted Least Squares
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt -0.078*** -0.11***
(0.009) (0.016)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Controli -0.076*** -0.10***
(0.01) (0.026)
ExposureIT
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi -0.081*** -0.11***
(0.014) (0.02)
Bank-firm specialization X X X X
Bank controls X X X X
Firm-time F.E. X X X X
Firm-bank F.E. X X X X
Instrument: ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt First stage
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt 0.65***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Controli 0.67***
(0.02)
ExposureOC
−i,b × Postt × Treatedi 0.57***
(0.03)
F-Stat 12.1 12.3
Observations 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334 1,945,334
Adj.R2 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 7 and
8, where observations are weighted by the log-employment of firms. The dependent
variable is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t, lnCibt.
We split the sample between firms that are in sector whose exposure to China compe-
tition is above median (treated firms) and below median (control firms), as defined in
Equation 1. The variable ExposureIT
−i,b captures bank exposure to China’s entrance in
the WTO, similarly to definition in Equation 3 but using banks’ total assets in the de-
nominator. In columns (2) and (4) this is instrumented with the variable ExposureOC
−i,b,
where bank exposure is defined using imports from China of other advanced coun-
tries, as defined in Equation 6. Bank controls include bank characteristics pre-2001
interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding
ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank
dummies, and a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank
specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are double clustered at the bank and
sector level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at
the 10% level.
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Table A7: Shift-share clustering
Full sample Treated Control
Dependent : lnCibt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ExposureITb × Postt -0.088*** -0.109** -0.099*** -0.119* -0.007*** -0.094*
(0.010) (0.049) (0.016) (0.070) (0.010) (0.049)
Observations 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080 2,080
Adj.R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.05
Note: The table reports shift-share IV coefficients from equivalent industry-level regressions
(as in Borusyak et al. (2018)). Standard errors allow for clustering at the level of four-digit
sector, and are valid in the framework of Adao, Kolesar andMorales (2018). Columns (1) and
(2) report OLS and IV estimates on the full sample, Columns (3) and (4) on the subsample
of treated firms, Columns (5) and (6) on the subsample of control firms. In contrast to the
baseline estimates, for this table bank exposure is computed without leaving out firm i from
credit weights in equation 3. The reported number of observations refers to the number
of observations in the equivalent industry-level regressions. The variable ExposureIT
−i,b is
instrumented with the variableExposureOC
−i,b, where bank exposure is defined using imports
from China of other advanced countries. Outcome and treatment residuals are obtained
from specifications which include bank controls (the following bank characteristics pre-2001
interacted with a post-2001 dummy: log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the
capital ratio), firm-year fixed effects, firm-bank dummies, and a dummy that captures if a
firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. ***significant at
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Figure A1: Industry-level variation in the specification where bank exposure is defined using a
continuous measure for sector exposure to competition from China
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Note: The figure plots binned scatterplots of industry-level outcome and treatment residuals against a continuous
measure of sector exposure to competition from China (as in Borusyak et al. (2018)). Outcome and treatment residuals
are obtained from a regression which includes the same controls as in the baseline specification and are then averaged
for the pre- and post-2001 periods; the difference between pre- and post-2001 average is then taken for both outcome
and treatment residuals. The lower panel replicates the same visual analysis excluding outliers (i.e. sectors in the bin
with the largest value of industry China shock.)
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